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Abstract : |
Instead of establishing trust through defining compliancy-based standards like protocols augmented by cryptographic methods, it is shown that trust can emerge as a self-organizing phenomenon in a complex dynamical system. It is assumed that trust can be modeled on basis of an intrinsic property called trustworthyness in every individual i, which is an objective measure for other individuals wether it is desirable to engage in an interaction with i or not. Trustworthiness can not directly be perceived, building trust therefore relates to estimating trustworthiness. Subjective criteria like outer appearance are important for building trust as they allow to handle unknown agents for whom data from previous interactions does not exist. Here, trustworthiness is grounded in the strategies of agents who engage in an extended version of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Trust is represented as preference to be grouped together with agents with a certain label to play a game. It is shown that stable relations of trust can emerge and that the co-evolution of trust boosts the evolution of cooperation. 1, |
